Below is the integral explanation that was sent to the Assembly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\"As the President of Montenegro, I fully support the improvement of the normative framework in the security sector, as well as the reform activities implemented by the current leadership of the National Security Agency. In this regard, I welcome the adoption of those legal solutions that will contribute to the improvement of the work of that institution.\"<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The nature of the relations regulated by this Law, as well as the justifiably heightened public sensitivity, oblige us to a special degree of caution and responsibility. Negative practices from the past, which resulted in numerous criminal proceedings against former heads of the Agency, precisely in relation to the Agency's jurisdiction, serve as a permanent reminder that legal powers must be precisely defined, and independent oversight must be strict and efficient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bearing in mind the above, and guided by the principle of full compliance with European standards, I believe it is necessary to point out the controversial provisions of the adopted law. They have been rightly pointed out by the European Commission as well as non-governmental organizations working in this area (MANS, Institute Alternative, HRA and others).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. Incompatibility with the EU acquis<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The provisions of the adopted law are not aligned with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the EU Law Enforcement Directive (LED), as officially stated by the European Commission. Although the EC leaves the possibility of subsequent alignment until<\/p>\n\n\n\n
closing of negotiations, from the aspect of the interests of Montenegrin citizens and the protection of their fundamental rights, it is crucial that the legal framework in this sensitive area is immediately harmonized with the highest European standards, and not that this process is postponed without stating clear reasons for doing so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2. Incompatibility with the Constitution of Montenegro and international standards regarding the right to privacy<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The key contentious solution of the Law is reflected in the fact that it abolishes prior court approval for the application of secret surveillance measures that include monitoring, observation and electronic searches in a public place with the use of technical means for documentation. This is a measure that enables the secret and systematic recording of an individual's movements, contacts, behavior and habits. Although these measures are implemented in public space, their nature and scope show that they can provide a deep and systematic insight into an individual's private life, all without prior court approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Such a solution must be viewed in light of constitutional and international guarantees of the right to privacy. Article 40 of the Constitution of Montenegro stipulates that \u201cthe right to respect for private and family life is guaranteed\u201d. This constitutional guarantee obliges the legislator to regulate measures that may seriously infringe on the private sphere of citizens in a restrictive manner and with appropriate protective mechanisms, which is not the case here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The protection of privacy is also confirmed in international human rights instruments, which are binding on Montenegro. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence. The same principle is enshrined in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy and guarantees the right to the protection of the law against such interference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the European level, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, with the rule that public authorities may interfere with the exercise of this right only if such interference is prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society to protect legitimate aims, including national security and public safety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It follows from these constitutional and international standards that it is not enough for the law to merely provide for the possibility of secret surveillance. When a measure enables the systematic collection of data on the movements, contacts and behaviour of a person, the law must at the same time provide for effective mechanisms of protection against arbitrariness and abuse. The abolition of prior judicial authorisation weakens precisely this protective mechanism, since the decision to intrude on privacy remains exclusively in the hands of the executive authority that proposes and implements the measure, without prior control by an independent body of the judicial branch of government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
3. Disregard for the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on the limits of privacy in public spaces<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Secret surveillance measures are by their nature such that they necessarily infringe on the right to privacy. This is precisely why international standards do not assume that their application is prohibited in all cases, but rather that there must be a clear balance between the state's interest in protecting security and the individual's right to privacy. This balance is ensured by protective mechanisms, one of the most important of which is independent oversight of the application of such measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For this protective mechanism to make any sense, it must first be clear that the measure in question falls under the right to privacy at all. This is confirmed by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court has clearly shown that the fact that certain actions, such as monitoring and surveillance, are carried out in a public place does not mean that they fall outside the protection of Article 8 of the European Convention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the case of Uzun v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights found that GPS tracking also constitutes interference with private life, even though it takes place in a public space. The court emphasized that visual and audio surveillance are even more sensitive, as they can reveal more information about a person's behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The European Court's rulings lead to a clear conclusion: such measures are not in themselves impermissible, but precisely because they infringe on the right to privacy, they must be accompanied by effective safeguards. In this case, the problem is not that the law provides for the possibility of their application, but that it removes one of the key safeguards for their application \u2014 prior judicial review. This disrupts the balance between the legitimate interest of the state in the protection of national security on the one hand and the protection of citizens' right to privacy on the other, which is not in line with the standards of the European Court of Human Rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
4. Removal of judicial supervision without valid reason<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is further worrying that no convincing or logical reason was given for the revocation of the prior court approval. The previous legal solution already allowed for urgent action in cases where consequences were imminent, so that the Director of the Agency could immediately order the application of the measure, with the obligation to submit the request for approval without delay to the court, which had to decide within 48 hours. If the approval was not granted, the measure had to be suspended and the collected material destroyed. The very existence of such a model shows that it was possible to ensure operational efficiency and independent control at the same time. Therefore, the complete removal of the court from the procedure cannot be justified by practical reasons, but rather represents a weakening of the existing protection of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. It is also particularly important that the measure in question can last up to two years, while the law does not prescribe clearly enough what happens to the collected data after the termination of the measure, which further reinforces the need for prior judicial supervision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
5. The need for further review of other disputed solutions<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition to the reasons mentioned, it is important to point out that the law was not prepared and adopted with a sufficiently inclusive approach and legal certainty, even though it regulates particularly sensitive issues that<\/p>\n\n\n\n
relate to privacy, the work of the Agency, the disposal of public funds and the position of employees. The need for additional review was also pointed out by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, who expressed concern about certain solutions and the lack of adequate protective guarantees. Similar comments came from domestic experts and interested public, not only in relation to secret surveillance measures, but also in relation to issues of public procurement, as well as the establishment and termination of employment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By returning this law for reconsideration, I am enabling the proponent of the law to eliminate the aforementioned normative deficiencies and propose to the Parliament of Montenegro a law that will be in full compliance with the Constitution and European standards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Accordingly, I believe that it is necessary for the Parliament of Montenegro to be re-determined according to the Law in question.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The President of Montenegro, Jakov Milatovi\u0107, returned for reconsideration the Law on the National Security Agency, which was adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro of the 28th convocation at the Second Session of the First Regular (Spring) Session in 2026, on March 6, 2026.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":928759,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[1064,27482,451],"naslovna":[],"class_list":["post-937319","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politika","tag-anb","tag-jakov-milatovi","tag-skupstina"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/937319","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=937319"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/937319\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":937320,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/937319\/revisions\/937320"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/928759"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=937319"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=937319"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=937319"},{"taxonomy":"naslovna","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gradski.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/naslovna?post=937319"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}